What does the US public believe about the credibility of institutional actors when it comes to protecting information privacy online? Drawing on perspectives of environmental risk, this article addresses the question through a nationally representative telephone survey of 1200 adults who go online at home. A key result is that a substantial percentage of internet users believes that major corporate or government institutions will both help them to protect information privacy and take that privacy away by disclosing information to other parties without permission. This finding and others raise questions about the dynamics of risk-perception and institutional trust on the web. What does the US public believe about the credibility of institutional actors when it comes to protecting information privacy online? Drawing on perspectives of environmental risk, this article addresses the question through a nationally representative telephone survey of 1200 adults who go online at home. A key result is that a substantial percentage of internet users believes that major corporate or government institutions will both help them to protect information privacy and take that privacy away by disclosing information to other parties without permission. This finding and others raise questions about the dynamics of risk-perception and institutional trust on the web.
The internet is an important crossroads where institutions in US society communicate with members of the public. Marketers, media firms, other businesses and governments interact with online users in ways that involve retrieval of information about the users' actions, interests and personal characteristics. Yet surveys conducted over the past few years indicate consistently that the majority of American adults are worried about websites taking information from them without their knowledge as well as sharing data about them with other organizations. Resisting advocacy group demands for government regulation, major organizations with stakes in the online world have insisted that self-regulation works. Through their trade associations, they have set up models for privacy policies and information exchange. Publicizing these guidelines, they argue that members of the public should trust them to respect people's information wishes as well as to help people learn to protect their information privacy.
Policymakers have been wrestling over the acceptability and credibility of these approaches to members of the public. The present study addresses the issue from a perspective of environmental risk and the public's trust of institutions. Sociologists of risk point out that in the contemporary era, hazards in the environment are increasingly diffused rather than directly visible. They note that the uncertainty invites battles over the reality of the risks and their causes. From this perspective, the issue of internet privacy can be seen as a struggle over the public's construction of diffused risks, what institutional actors are to blame for them and which to trust to reduce them. Although the topic of institutional blame and trust lies at the heart of discussions of internet policy, researchers have not addressed it with the depth and complexity that it deserves.
That is the aim of this article. It explores views on internet privacy and institutional trust through a nationally representative telephone survey of 1200 adults who go online at home. A key finding is that a substantial percentage of internet users believes that major corporate or government institutions will both help them to protect information privacy and take that privacy away by disclosing information to other parties without permission. This and other results raise questions about why members of the public might agree simultaneously with clashing beliefs about institutional actors' roles in risk-creation and riskreduction.
RISK AND TRUST ONLINE
At the beginning of 2004, about 57 percent of US households were connected to the internet (Horrigan, 2004) . Around that period, Americans were going online more than one hour a day (Cole et al., 2003: 19) . Moreover, a large body of literature was indicating that the internet was becoming integrated into many common societal activities. As Pew Project director Lee Rainie noted about the internet as early as 2001, 'every day it looks more and more like the rest of America' (Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2001 ).
While the online experience has been integrating deeply into US life, expressions of concern about the violation of information privacy have proliferated. Perhaps because of media coverage of the topic (Turow et al., 2000) , surveys conducted over the past few years indicate that the majority of American adults are worried that websites collect information from them without their permission and share data about them with other organizations. For example, Alan Westin's Privacy and American Business consultancy found that in 2002, 56 percent of US adults believed that most businesses did not 'handle personal information they collect in a proper and confidential way'. In 1999, 34 percent had answered that way. Westin concluded that higher percentages of Americans had become sensitive to privacy issues online; in 2001 he said that only 8 percent were 'unconcerned' about the issue (Westin, 2003: 290) .
The sociology of risk and trust
In trying to understand the social dynamics behind this broadly recognized US public concern about internet privacy, it is useful to link these worries to the literature about the relationship between risk and trust. As Oscar Renn and colleagues noted, risk can be conceived as both 'a potential for harm' and the 'social construction of worry ' (2000: 35) .Their dual definition reflects that although an actual physical reality of danger may exist around a particular phenomenon, the way that people understand a potential danger plays a large role in determining its centrality as a topic within their society. Sociologists of risk point out that the notion of a hazardous environment has grown in the late modern age, as media and interpersonal sources make people aware of the dangers posed to them by industrial activities. Examples include hearing that genetically-modified crops are unhealthy for humans and animals to eat or that cars and factories contaminate the air to the point that they may cause lung problems. The common thread among such dangers is that they are not visible to the general population; belief in their existence is (or is not) justified by the reports of dueling experts. Maurie Cohen notes that without any means to definitively ascertain these phenomena the public argument about environmental dangers becomes 'a battleground over cultural symbols. In choosing sides, ordinary people must judge the credibility of expert institutions and contrast these interpretations with their own experiences' (Cohen, 2000: 25) .
Cohen's idea of credibility is close to Fukuyama's definition of trust: belief that an actor is involved in 'regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms' (Fukuyama, 1996: 26) . It is likely that whether or not people find assurances by particular institutional actors trustworthy regarding safety would depend on the extent to which people believe that those actors understand public norms about risk, and cooperate to let society know honestly how 'the facts' of potential dangers, as they know them, match the norms. Lack of institutional trust can be socially corrosive, particularly if it is generalized to a wide range of organizations. William Freudenberg (2000) emphasizes that during the past century there has been a dramatic growth of societal interdependence. As the process has advanced, he says:
There has been a substantial decline in the ability of the broader society to assure that its specialists do indeed serve the interests of the larger collectivity and that its 'responsible officials' do indeed act responsibly. (2000: 108) Debates about online risk In the USA, marketers, media and government specialists use people's information in a broad gamut of ways and with varying concerns for how far the data travel. Although many of these emphasize personally identifiable information, not all of them do. Tracking people anonymously still can lead to useful targeting for marketers. An important example is the Claria Corporation, which places its 'Gator' tracking files into people's computers when they download free software such as the Kazaa file-sharing program.
The idea that internet users' electronic actions are becoming increasingly transparent has alarmed some. Many critics emphasize the danger that some kinds of personal information may fall into the hands of companies or people who could take advantage of the consumer (see for example, Schwartz, 2003) .
Others note that sites' application of email addresses in the service of marketing has helped the proliferation of unwanted email on the web, adding to a spam epidemic which has internet users and their service providers steaming (Hansell, 2003) . In the wake of the anti-terror Patriot Act of 2001, critics also worry that various government agencies will expand the tracking and generalizing about consumers on the web that had until recently seemed to be the domain of business (Jesdanun, 2003) .They point out the profound damage that errors or names on suspect lists can cause individuals and families.
Concerned about what they agree are substantial risks to personal data that citizens incur when going online, privacy advocates have urged a variety of approaches to online information-gathering activities. They have encouraged technological solutions that will allow web users to protect their information.
1 They have lobbied for legislation that would stop companies from collecting certain forms of information. And they have demanded that online actors be required to tell consumers about the extent to which, and way in which, they collect and exploit people people's electronic information.
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Marketers and commercial websites have resisted the possibility of government edicts and offered self-regulation as a model. The Direct Marketing Association, the Association for Internet Marketers and the Internet Advertising Bureau are among the organizations that represent a variety of information hungry stakeholders such as major advertisers, banks, credit card companies and software companies. They have set up models for privacy policies and information exchange which, they argue, can ensure that consumers will be able to control whether websites can share their information about them. For example, the Direct Marketing Association (2003) notes 'the DMA Promise' in its online 'helpful guide' to consumers: 'The Direct Marketing Association Privacy Promise is an assurance to consumers that US Marketers who are DMA members will use your information in a manner that respects your wishes'.
Such language is the rhetoric of trust. The Direct Marketing Association statement describes an approach consistent with Fukuyama's definition of trust as 'regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms ' (1996: 26) . Companies that support self-regulation online argue that members of the public will agree that the companies are credible sources for helping them learn how to protect their privacy on their sites. In Freudenberg's (2000) terms, they contend that they are carrying out their responsibilities with the degree of vigor necessary to merit societal trust. Do Americans believe that? To what extent does the US public perceive that institutional actors who are regularly involved with the internet are likely to help them learn how to protect their privacy? Alternatively, to what extent does the public think that these actors are likely to share their information with others without their knowledge? Does personal experience -expertise with the web, time online or a bad privacy experience on the internet -predict more or less trust of institutional experts than that held by most Americans who are online? Although answers to these questions are crucial to establishing benchmarks of institutional trust regarding this emerging medium, researchers have not addressed them. Our national survey was designed to do this.
METHOD Survey
The survey instrument we created was implemented by the International Communication Research (ICR) survey research firm from 30 January to 21 March 2003.Telephone interviews, which averaged 20 minutes, were completed with a nationally representative sample of 1200 adults aged 18 and older who said responded 'yes' when asked 'Do you use the internet at home?' Respondents were selected using a random digit dial sample to screen households for adults age 18 or older who use the internet at home; of the households that we telephoned, 53.3 percent had at least one household member who met our eligibility requirements -a percentage similar to the 2001 Consumer Population Survey. Among those households, the percentage of eligible individuals who completed an interview was 66.4 percent. The data were weighted by age, education and race to the 2001 Consumer Population Survey, which asked adults aged 18 or older questions similar to that used in the internet privacy study to ascertain internet use at home.
Interviews
The interviews explored demographic, attitudinal, knowledge and activity patterns related to the internet. Among these, respondents' own assessment were solicited of their abilities to 'go online or navigate the internet', that is, whether they considered themselves 'beginners', 'intermediate users', 'advanced users' or 'expert users'. Other questions led to the development of six new variables: three behavioral, two attitudinal and one concerned with regulatory policy. In addition, two scales were developed to measure the respondents' trust in the online world's major institutional actors. We expected to find that the behavioral, attitudinal and policy variables would be associated with the two institutional trust scales to predict people's disposition for personal action and government regulation in the name of privacy.
The behavioral measure, 'active wariness', brings together activities where the respondents showed an active concern about web privacy. They were asked if they: 'Argued with a family member about personal or family information that the person released to a chatroom or on email' (2.2% said yes);'Had an incident where you worried about something a family member told a website' (1.7% said yes); 'Chose not to register on a website because it asked you for personal information to get into the site' (34.6%);'Talked with a family member about how to deal with requests for information from websites' (12.4%); and 'Searched for instructions on how to protect information about yourself on the web' (5.9%).
The behavior variable, 'disclosing behavior', addressed whether the respondents gave out information on websites (the range of responses was 'always', 'sometimes', or 'never'; these items were recoded to 'always' versus the other values).The behaviors and their prevalence were: 'Give mail address' (12.3%), 'Give email address' (19.2%), 'Give real name' (33%) and 'Give age' (47.8%).The variable 'protecting behavior' was computed from a set of dichotomous items asking about the respondent's behavior in preventing information disclosure through the following actions: 'Used software that looks for spyware on your computer' (22.8%);'Used software that hides your computer's identity from websites that you visit' (17.8%); 'Used a filter program to block unwanted emails' (44.4%); and 'Erased all or some of the unwanted cookies on your computer' (67.9%).
The two measures of attitudes related to 'fear of disclosure' and 'trust of the internet'. The 'fear of disclosure' variable was constructed from seven five-point Likert items (from strongly agree to strongly disagree) which reflected a concern about lack of control over personal information on the web: 'I am more concerned about giving away sensitive information online than about giving away sensitive information any other way'; 'I should have a legal right to know everything that a website knows about me'; 'My concern about outsiders learning sensitive information about me and my family has increased since we've gone online'; 'I look to see if a website has a privacy policy before answering any questions'; 'Teenagers should have to get their parent's consent before giving out information online'; 'I sometime worry that members of my family give information they shouldn't about our family to web sites'; and 'I am nervous about websites having information about me'.
The 'trust of the internet' variable tapped into the respondents' general belief in the online world's credibility regarding privacy. It was constructed from two five-point Likert items (strongly agree to strongly disagree): 'I trust websites not to share information with other companies or advertisers when they say they won't'; and 'When a website has a privacy policy, I know that the site will not share my information with other websites or companies'.
The 'regulation' variable measured peoples' sense of the effectiveness of different forms of possible regulation of the internet regarding privacy. It was constructed from three items concerning the respondents' perception of the effectiveness of potential laws that would hinder companies' ability to collect personal information from online users without their consent. The items were: 'A law that requires website privacy policies to have easy-to-understand rules and the same format'; 'A law that requires companies that collect personal information online to help pay for courses that teach internet users how to protect their privacy online'; and 'A law that gives you the right to control how websites use and share the information they collect about you'.
When it came to measuring the respondents' trust in the online world's major institutional actors, complexity in response was allowed for by taking two routes, one positive and the other negative. The positive expression of trust was the belief that an institutional actor would help or teach the respondent to protect personal information online. We asked each person:
Please think about your ability in the next five years to control personal information collected about you online. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most important and 1 being the least important, how important a role will [insert name of institution] play in helping or teaching you to protect your personal information online?
The major institutional actors selected were: 'Your internet service provider', 'Banks or credit card companies', 'Major advertisers', 'Microsoft Corporation', 'Privacy protection software companies' and 'The government.' These were presented in random order across the respondents. The alpha for the sixitem scale was .79 (scale mean=3.49, SD=.94, range=1-5), a high score that indicates its component statements were internally consistent.
The negative expression of trust was a belief that an institutional actor would release or share information about the respondent without the person's knowledge or consent. We phrased the 'institutional disclosing' question by asking each person:
On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most important and 1 being the least important, how likely will [name of institution] be to release or share information about you by accident or on purpose without your knowledge or consent?
The institutional actors were identical to the previous list and were ordered randomly across respondents. The alpha for the six-item scale was also a high .79 (scale mean=3.29, SD=.95, range=1-5).
Multivariate analysis
For multivariate analysis, structural equation modeling and the AMOS program were used (Kline, 1998a) . Measurement modeling (Kline, 1998b ) was employed to investigate the factor structure of the relationships between the information-protecting and information-disclosing tendencies of the six internet-related institutional actors. Seemingly unrelated regression (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1986) was used to identify the important predictors of the institutional belief outcomes. To assess the fit of simultaneous equation models, the ߯ ଶ test as well the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) were used. 4 
RESULTS

Respondents' demographics
The sample comprised 49 percent of men and 51 percent of women; 77 percent designated their ethnicity as white, 13 percent were black or Hispanic, 7 percent gave their ethnicity as 'other' and 4 percent did not respond. One-third of the respondents were aged 18 or younger, 24 percent ranged from 35 to 44, 21 percent from 45 to 54, 11 percent from 55 to 64 and 8 percent were aged 65 or older (3% did not respond). More than half (56%) were parents of children under 18. Fully 39 percent graduated from college or higher, 22 percent attended some college, 32 percent graduated from high school or technical school and 7 percent did not graduate from high school. Although a substantial percentage (26%) said their household brought in more than $75,000 annually, an accurate estimate of the sample's income distribution is difficult because one-fifth of the respondents did not want to reveal it.
Almost half the adult population (46%) who use the internet at home had been going online from home for fewer than five years. Of the adults, 13 percent have been online from home for five years and 36 percent have been online for six years or more; 4 percent 'don't know'. The great majority of adults who used the web at home ranked themselves in the middle (intermediate or advanced) rather than lowest or highest range (beginner or expert) of abilities when it comes to navigating the internet; 14 percent considered themselves beginners and 13 percent called themselves experts, while 42 percent considered themselves intermediates and 30 percent said that they were advanced.
Online attitudes and behaviors
Where do these people fall when it comes to the measures of attitudes, behaviors and institutional trust that we noted? As the measures of the 'trust in the internet' in Table 1 indicate, when it comes to trusting the internet as a space where websites will protect information, the respondents are divided: some find website assurances credible and others do not. Nevertheless, these same people acknowledge a broad sense of risk about internet privacy; the average score on the five-category 'fear of disclosure' variable is a fairly high 3.757.
Yet the respondents' reported behavior does not mesh consistently with the fear. Their approach to giving websites information about themselves does reflect caution (as seen in a low disclosing behavior mean). Despite this wariness, the respondents indicated a low use of computer programs that can protect their information from leaving their computers (as seen for 'protecting behavior'). In fact, most of the respondents were not even high on active wariness, the measure of their general discussion and search for ways to protect their information privacy.
Perhaps because of their high concern about information privacy but relatively low involvement in specific protecting behaviors or attempts to learn about them, the respondents tended to like regulations that would force online firms to help internet users to protect their privacy. The regulation index mean of 3.13 out of 4 reflects that 86 percent of the respondents believed 'a law that requires website privacy policies to have easy-to-understand rules and the same format' would be somewhat or very effective; 84 percent agreed with the probable effectiveness of 'A law that gives you the right to control how websites use and share the information they collect about you'; and 74 percent similarly endorsed 'A law that requires companies that collect personal information online to help pay for courses that teach internet users how to protect their privacy online'.
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Conflict over institutional actors
The data indicate that adults who go online at home feel conflicted about whether key institutional actors -corporate or the government -will help them with their information privacy. A good way to see this is in Table 2 , which presents a new variable merging the answers to the two sets of questions on each actor or set of organizations. If a respondent answered that the actor would be important in helping to protect information online (a 4 or 5) and then said it would be unlikely to disclose information (a 1 or 2 on that variable), we considered that the person trusts the actor to help actively with information privacy. If a respondent answered that the actor was unlikely to help protect information (a 1 or 2) but then said it would be likely to disclose information (a 3 or 4), we considered that the person did not trust the institution to help actively with information privacy. If the person indicated that the actor was 'unimportant' with helping to protect information and unlikely to release it -or in the middle (a 3) on these issues -we considered that the respondent felt neither strongly trusting nor distrusting about the institution when it came to information privacy. Finally, if the respondent indicated that the institution would be important in helping to protect online information but then indicated that it was likely that the same institution would disclose personal information, we considered that person strongly conflicted. Table 2 shows that with the exception of major advertisers, straight trust or distrust is not the mode when it comes to information privacy. Between one-third and half of the respondents simply sit on the fence, not believing that they can trust or distrust an institutional actor when it comes to privacy. Even more interesting is the substantial percentage of strongly conflicted people: between one-third and onequarter are conflicted about how these key institutions of the digital world relate to their privacy. They seem to feel that while institutional actors will help them to control their information online, those same actors (or others parts of them) will take that information privacy away.
A look at the mean answers of the institutional actors on the individual 'protect' and 'disclose' reinforces the points in Table 2 and extends them. It turns out that major advertisers were collectively the only institutional actor with a mean below 3 on 'protect', while makers of privacy protection software were collectively the only actor with a mean below 3 on 'disclose'. Microsoft, the government, banks/credit card companies and internet service providers all fall between 3 and 4 (that is, in the 'important' and 'likely' range) on both 'protect' and 'disclose'. On each of these four actors, the 'protect' means are higher than the corresponding 'disclose' mean. Yet the differences, while statistically significant, are small -less than .5 in each case.
Taken together, the means and the cross tabulations indicate three related points. First, the respondents tend to rank the institutions as somewhat more important for protecting their information than having the likelihood to disclose it. Second, the generally small differences between the means of the two protecting and disclosing items by institutional actor reflect that when it comes to Microsoft, the government, banks/credit card companies and internet service providers, the proportions of respondents who see most of the actors as important for helping them to protect their information are not that different from the proportions who believe that it is likely that they will disclose their information without people's knowledge or consent (for example, while 51% of the respondents said that the government would be important to helping to protect privacy, 44% said that it was likely that the government would disclose information about them).Third, a substantial proportion of the adult population that uses the internet at home says that institutional actors both will disclose and help to protect their personal information online.
Associations with conflicted institutional trust
A logical next question is whether any of the behavioral or attitudinal variables that were measured help to predict or explain this conflicted understanding of institutional actors. When correlated, the demographic variables noted earlier -gender, ethnicity, education, family income and parental statusshow no patterned association with institutional trust. Table 3 presents a correlation matrix of all the previously described attitudinal and behavioral variables, with the institutional actors brought together in the institutional disclosing and institutional protecting scales.
Most of these significant correlations make sense. The respondents with higher online skills, for example, have lower fear of disclosure, presumably because they believe that their knowledge helps them to avoid organizations that eke personal information from web users. Similarly, we can suggest that higher skill associates with reduced trust because of greater awareness of the surreptitious behavior of websites and marketers. High skill levels presumably come with greater skepticism and so seem to attenuate the belief in the possibility of effective regulation of the access and distribution of personal information. Optimism about the effectiveness of regulations links to optimism that institutional actors will help people to protect their personal information; it is unrelated to the belief that the actors will disclose information without permission. Similarly, general internet trust is related positively to the information-protecting functions of institutional actors and negatively related to the informationdisclosing ones.
However, three of the associations in the table defy easy understanding. One reflects what Table  2 shows: to a substantial proportion of US adults who go online at home, the importance of each institutional actor's role in protecting personal data is associated positively with the expectation that the actor will disclose personal information either by accident or on purpose. Table 3 mirrors that finding in the .1846 correlation between 'institutional disclose' and 'institutional protect', and pushes this odd finding further. It shows that the skill of participants and their fear of disclosure both associate with the conflicting attitudes that relate to institutional trust and disclosure. It is hard to understand why fear of disclosure is associated positively with both a trust in protection and a belief that the organizations betray that trust by disclosing information. Similarly, it is mysterious why self-reported skill is associated negatively with both a trust in protection and a belief that organizations betray that trust by disclosing information.
Testing the associations
In view of these hard-to-explain correlations, it might be suggested that the positive association between the two seemingly contradictory institutional scales is really due to one or another of the institutional actors reflected in the scale being differentially related to the variables in a way that is not evident. We might also worry that the correlation between the two institutional scales is the result of simple measurement error which obscures the true correlation (or lack of correlation) between the five items measuring institutional disclosing and institutional protecting.
Ruling out the second possibility -that of measurement error between the institutional variablesrequires confirmatory factor analysis. It estimates the correlation between the two implied latent variables ('the importance of protecting information' and 'the likelihood of disclosing information') after adjusting for any measurement error. For each latent variable, the analysis used the responses to the question asked regarding each of the six institutional actors. The focus is the correlation between these two constructs.
The analysis found that the two key measures -the TLI and GFI -were excellent (GFI=.969 and TLI=.944). Moreover, the standardized regression coefficients relating the constructs to the indicators were, in all but two cases, a high .60 or larger. 6 The correlation between the constructs was estimated to be .27, discernable from zero and larger than the correlation between the scale values (.1846) shown in Table 3 , which are not adjusted for measurement error. The finding indicates that the positive correlation between the scale values is not the result of measurement error.
To rule out the other possibility -that the strange relationship between the institutional scales is due to a specific institutional actor's strange relationship with the skill or fear variables - Table 4 looks at the correlation of each of the separate institutional domains with the 'fear of disclosing' and 'skill' variables. Note that in the case of each variable, the direction of the correlation with institutional protecting and institutional disclosing that we saw in the matrix remains for statistically significant correlations. This means that the relationships that 'institutional protecting' and 'institutional disclosing' have with 'fear of disclosure' and 'skill' are not the result of a fluke sensibility of respondents regarding one institutional actor. Rather, the relationships reflect the simultaneous operation of opposing expectations toward the major institutional actors with respect to personal data on the internet.
Regression analysis of the institutional belief items
These tests of association confirmed the validity of the seemingly contradictory correlations noted between institutional trust and disclosure. The final step was to investigate whether the curious associations with disclosure fear and skills continue to be seen when controlling for the other variables. The results are shown in Table 5 .The rows of this table contain the results for the predictor variables and the columns contain the regression results for each institutional scale. 7 The table indicates that 'active wariness', 'disclosing behavior' and 'protecting behavior' do not by themselves predict whether adult home users of the internet believe that the institutional actors will help people to protect or disclose their information online. Time online is related to the decreasing belief that institutional actors will help to protect personal information. Internet trust and favoring regulation predict a belief that institutional actors will protect and not disclose. Having more self-reported skill also associates with the optimistic opinion that institutional actors will not disclose information without permission. Unlike in Table 3 , when controlling for other variables, it does not associate positively with the pessimistic opinion that institutional actors will disclose information permission. Fear of disclosure, by contrast, still relates oddly to both. As in Table 3 's correlation matrix, fear of disclosure associates positively with both institutional protecting and institutional disclosing.
DISCUSSION
Each of the significant relationships is provocative and invites further thinking and research on the dynamics of institutional trust. For example, it may seem logical that a greater number of years using the internet associates with a decreasing belief that the institutional actors' can be trusted to help people online to protect information. This might come about because people who have been online for some time may have become more knowledgeable about the surreptitious ways in which websites and internet marketers try to get information. It may seem logical also that having more skill links to a view that institutional actors will not disclose information without permission. It might be taken to mean that greater self-reported expertise means greater trust in the establishment. These two interpretations do not necessarily exclude each other. However, they do invite questions about why skill should have a very different relationship to trust than time online does -especially when time online and skill are correlated significantly with one another (see Table 1 ).The finding deserves further investigation.
Yet it is Table 4 's association of fear of disclosure with the opinion that institutional actors will both protect internet information and disclose it that raises the most interesting challenge to understanding. In so doing, it forces the positive correlation of users' beliefs in both institutional protection and institutional disclosure to the center of attention. The message here is that, irrespective of their background and beliefs (and especially if they are fearful about information privacy), adults who use the internet at home simultaneously tend to voice two potentially contradictory beliefs: that major institutional actors will work to help them protect their personal information online, yet disclose information to other parties without internet users' permission or knowledge.
From the standpoint of the sociology of risk, this study's findings highlight the idea that members of the public might agree simultaneously with clashing beliefs about the roles of institutional actors in risk-creation and risk-reduction. This, in turn, begs the question: why? One answer is that much of the public is simply confused by the battles over responsibility for the environmental risks regarding information privacy. The segment of the public which defines the privacy risk as high -that is, the more fearful part -is also more likely to be befuddled by advocacy groups' claims blaming various major institutional actors (e.g. major advertisers, Microsoft, even the government) and those actors' claims that they are part of the solution, not the problem. The other possible causal direction is that people who are confused by the claims and counterclaims might become more fearful and so define the privacy risk as high.
A very different explanation for the public's clashing beliefs about institutional actors' inconsistencies is that far from reflecting confusion, it mirrors a sophisticated public understanding of the institutions that they are being asked to trust or distrust. This view would argue that the government, banks and credit card companies, software manufacturers and even major advertisers are all large and variegated. Therefore, it is not at all unbelievable that parts of these organizations try to cultivate public trust by helping people to protect their information even while other parts take their information without consent. Accordingly, it is quite reasonable for people to state that the same institutional actors will help to protect information and will disclose it at the same time.
